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The Medicare drug benefit was not designed in a way to minimize costs to the 
government and beneficiaries. Instead, Congress designed a plan that ensures 
high profits for the pharmaceutical and insurance industries. One result of this 
design is that the Medicare drug benefit includes an unusual $2,850 gap in 
coverage, where beneficiaries are entirely responsible for their drug bills. The 
standard plan covers 75 percent of prescription drug costs until the 
beneficiary’s drug expenditures reach $2,250 for the year. The beneficiary is 
then fully liable for their drug expenses until they reach $5,100.
1 At that point, 
the insurance kicks back in, covering 95 percent of additional drug costs.  
 
This gap in coverage was put into the plan to save the government money. 
While the bill was intended to assist seniors with their drug expenses, Congress 
wanted to limit public spending on the program. The “doughnut hole” gap in 
coverage was the mechanism chosen. The excess profits of the prescription 
drug industry are the main factor that led to the need for the doughnut hole. 
This paper calculates the amount of excess profits of the 20 most commonly 
used drugs, and compares them to the size of the doughnut hole. 
 
Of course, the doughnut hole was not the only way that Congress could have 
limited the cost of the program. Congress chose to administer the program 
through private insurers instead of allowing the public Medicare system to 
offer the drug benefit as a simple add-on. It is far more expensive to 
administer the program through private insurers because they incur marketing 
expenses. Private insurers also have highly paid top executives and must 
produce profits for their shareholders. According to the Congressional Budget 
Office, the decision to administer the plan through private insurers added 
almost $5 billion to the annual cost of the program, an amount that is equal to 
22 percent of the size of the doughnut hole gap in coverage.
2
Dean Baker is co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C. Lynn 
Erskine and Liz Chimienti helped in editing this paper.
                                                 
1 The size of this gap is projected to increase by approximately 8.5 percent annually since the cutoffs are indexed to 
average per person drug expenditures for people included in the Medicare drug benefit.  
2 This is discussed in Baker, D. 2006a. “The Savings From an Efficient Medicare Drug Benefit,” Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Economic and Policy Research, [http://www.cepr.net/publications/efficient_medicare_2006_01.pdf].  The Origins of the Doughnut Hole: Excess Profits on Prescription Drugs • 2 
TABLE 1





Actonel Proctor& Gamble 9.7 372 703 903 223.8
Aricept Pfizer 4.3 1059 1553 1796 143.9
Celebrex Pfizer 11.0 632 903 1107 216.4
Fosamax Merck 17.9 265 728 903 543.9
furosemide (generic) 34.8 9 13 89 60.9
Lipitor (10 mg) Pfizer 31.6 520 749 927 530.1
Lipitor (20 mg) Pfizer 31.6 782 1068 1302 669.8
metoprolol tartrate (generic) 22.0 7 12 90 39.4
Nexium AstraZeneca 22.9 848 850 1652 358.5
Norvasc (5 mg) Pfizer 16.3 316 463 593 180.8
Norvasc (10 mg) Pfizer 16.3 490 637 795 188.8
Plavix Bristol-Myer's 18.8 989 1284 1529 412.4
Prevacid AstraZeneca 22.2 657 862 1650 603.1
Protonix Wyeth 16.4 214 1111 1529 990.4
Toprol XL (50 mg) AstraZeneca 8.2 163 225 343 48.4
Toprol XL (100 mg) AstraZeneca 8.2 250 336 491 65.7
Xalatan Pfizer 6.9 280 556 701 130.2
Zocor (20 mg) Merck 11.2 127 1275 1776 855.7
Zocor (40 mg) Merck 11.2 191 1275 1711 800.4
Zoloft Pfizer 27.0 542 787 1170 585.2
Total 








Part D       
(low)
Part D     
(high)
 
Congress also prevented Medicare from directly negotiating price discounts with drug 
manufacturers, as is done by the Veterans Administration and the health care systems in most other 
wealthy countries. As a result, prescription drugs cost far more under the Medicare drug benefit plan 
than is necessary. In the case of many drugs, the prices paid by insurers participating in the plan are 
more than twice as high as the prices paid by the Veterans Administration.  
 
Since the industry is already making a profit at the price for which it sells drugs to the Veterans 
Administration, the higher price paid by the private insurers participating in the Medicare drug 
benefit is pure profit for the drug industry. The excess profits earned by the industry as a result of 
these higher prices can be thought of as the “doughnut” in the Medicare drug benefit. It is relatively 
simple to get an approximation of the size of these excess profits for the most widely used drugs. 
 
Table 1 calculates the amount of excess profits earned on each of the twenty drugs most frequently 
used by seniors. (See the appendix for a full explanation of the construction of the table and 
sources.) The first column lists the drugs in alphabetical order. The second column shows the  The Origins of the Doughnut Hole: Excess Profits on Prescription Drugs • 3 
manufacturer for each of the brand drugs. The third column shows the total number of 
prescriptions issued for each drug in 2005. The fourth column shows the lowest price at which the 
drug is available through the Veterans Administration. The fifth and sixth columns show, 
respectively, the lowest and highest prices listed for the same drugs from private insurers 
participating in the Medicare drug program. The last column shows the excess profits earned on 
each of the drugs. The calculation of excess profits is based on the difference between a weighted 
average of the prices available through insurers participating in the Medicare drug benefit and the 
price at which the drug can be obtained through the Veterans Administration.
3
 
The table shows that for several of the drugs the excess profits are substantial. For example, the 
excess profits earned on Protonix, a heartburn medication, are calculated as just under $1 billion. 
The combined excess profits earned on the two dosages for Zocor, a cholesterol lowering drug, are 
more than $1.6 billion. The combined excess profits for the two dosages of Lipitor, another 
cholesterol lowering drug, come to $1.2 billion.   
 
















Source: Author's calculations, see appendix.  
 
The excess profits on this small group of drugs is in fact fairly sizable relative to the doughnut hole 
gap in coverage under the prescription drug plan. Figure 1 shows the size of excess profits on these 
drugs relative to the size of the doughnut hole. The excess profit earned on Protonix alone is almost 
5 percent of the size of the doughnut hole, the excess profits on Lipitor are close to 6 percent of the 
size of the doughnut hole.  
 
In fact, there are thousands of different types of drugs, dosages, and delivery mechanisms, which in 
nearly all cases cost more than necessary under the Medicare drug plan, because Congress prohibited 
                                                 
3 The weights for the insurers’ prices are 0.67 for the lowest price from a private insurer and 0.33 for the highest price. 
The assumption is that most drugs brought through the private plans are bought at prices that are close to the lowest 
available price in the system.   The Origins of the Doughnut Hole: Excess Profits on Prescription Drugs • 4 
Medicare from directly negotiating drug prices with the pharmaceutical industry. If Medicare had 
been allowed to negotiate in the same way as the Veteran’s Administration, the savings would have 
been more than enough to eliminate the doughnut hole gap in coverage. The calculations in this 
paper simply show the size of the excess profits on a small subset of this group. The excess profits 
for the industry as a whole, measured as the gap between the prices paid under Medicare Part D and 
the prices paid by the Veteran’s Administration will be close to $50 billion in the first full year of the 
program’s operation. This is more than twice the size of the doughnut hole.
4 
                                                 
4 This calculation can be found in Baker 2006a.   The Origins of the Doughnut Hole: Excess Profits on Prescription Drugs • 5 
Appendix 
 
The list of the twenty most frequently used drug by seniors, as well as the Veterans Administration 
and Medicare Part D prices, is taken from Families USA, 2006. “Big Dollars, Little Sense: Rising 
Medicare Prescription Drug Prices,” Washington, D.C.: Families USA. 
[http://www.familiesusa.org/resources/publications/reports/big-dollars-little-sense.html] 
 
The number of prescriptions for each drug was based on the 2005 data from RxList – “Top 300 
Drugs”[http://www.rxlist.com/top200a.htm]. In cases where different dosages of the same drug 
appear on the Families USA list, the calculations assume that prescriptions are evenly divided 
between the two dosages. The calculations assume that each prescription corresponds to one-
month’s usage, so that the number of prescriptions was divided by 12 to get the number of full year 
users. The calculations also assume that 70 percent of the prescriptions for the top 20 drugs among 
seniors were used by seniors in the Medicare drug plan. The savings per user are calculated as the 
difference between a weighted average of highest and lowest Medicare drug benefit price (0.67* the 
lowest price + 0.33 * the highest price) and the Veterans Administration price. The size of the 
doughnut hole for figure 1 is calculated as $20.4 billion.
5  
 
                                                 
5 See Baker, D. 2006b. “Waste in the Medicare Drug Benefit: Why the Doughnut Hole Is Unnecessary,” Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy Research [http://www.cepr.net/publications/medicare_waste_2006_07.pdf]. 